Why does Organizational Performance Fluctuate in Agricultural Industrialization Consortia: A Study Based on Dual Paradox in Development and Institution
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4335/19.3.921-941(2021)Keywords:
agricultural industrialization consortium, organizational performance, institutional construction, economic development, local governmentAbstract
Agricultural industrialization consortium is a key policy tool to promote agricultural development for local governments in China. However, a stylized fact is that various consortia showed promising organizational performance at start, but then the performance deteriorated at later stages. The driving force behind is the dual paradox inherent in development and institution. The consortium is overly development oriented; yet as an institution it cannot adapt to the strong development impulses. Case studies show that the dual paradox inevitably led to the decline in organizational performance.
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