From Classical Toward Experimental Federalism: Different Pathways for a More Inclusive and Balanced European Union

  • Matjaz Nahtigal University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, Cankarjeva 5, 6104 Koper
Keywords: classical and cooperative federalism, experimental governance, subsidiarity, regional institutional innovations, top-down vs. bottom-up EU integration

Abstract

A growing number of scholars, academics and policy-makers advocate substantial reforms of the existing European institutional architecture. Advocates of deepening the European integration recommend that the optimal development of the European Union (EU) would be to establish a fully developed banking union, an advanced form of fiscal union and to ultimately achieve a political union based on common economic governance. Accordingly, the ideal scenario for European integration would be to adopt, to the largest possible extent, a path toward the classical federal model. Leaving aside the practical feasibility of such a development, the purpose of this article is to explore whether a direction toward the model of classical federalism is the only possible way forward for European integration. Comparative constitutionalism has developed several substantially different models of federalism. Therefore, this article explores other possible trajectories for European integration while pointing to the limitations of classical federalism. In the face of the protracted social and economic crises in many European member states and their regions, article also examines the possibilities of establishing cooperative or even experimental federalism as a new model for European integration.

Author Biography

Matjaz Nahtigal, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management, Cankarjeva 5, 6104 Koper
Associate Professor

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Published
2016-07-31
Section
Conference Paper