How Does Fiscal Autonomy Influence Fiscal Outcomes Depending on Corruption

  • Soyoung Park Incheon National University
  • Sungchan Kim Catholic University of Korea
Keywords: fiscal autonomy, corruption, fiscal outcomes, financial monitoring


As fiscal decentralization has been vigorously implemented, fiscal autonomy has become more prevalent in subnational governments. However, fiscal outcomes with greater fiscal autonomy depend upon how well and how responsibly government finances are managed. This study examines how fiscal autonomy affects fiscal outcomes depending on the level of corruption by using a panel data set of 83 cities in South Korea from 2010 to 2017. According to the results, fiscal autonomy causes local governments to spend more. However, its effectiveness may differ based on the composition of fiscal autonomy and its expenditure categories. Additionally, this study finds that less corrupt local governments spend less and have less debt under higher levels of fiscal autonomy.


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