Local Government Public Debt Rules in the Visegrad Group Countries as Tools for the Optimization of Socio-Economic Development
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4335/16.3.569-590(2018)Keywords:
Sub-central government, fiscal rules, fiscal discipline, indicators, calibrationAbstract
The use of fiscal rules as an instrument of fiscal sustainability is manifested, most of all, by imposing the requirements as regards borrowing and the costs of public debt service, and most research is conducted in this context. In this article, the Authors ask a different question altogether: does the right selection of calibration factors for fiscal rules with respect to debt, as applied at Visegrad Group’s local government entities, have an impact on the fiscal discipline, on the one hand, and on the other, is it a factor contributing to sustainable socio-economic development of regions? A mixed method, one combining the results of qualitative and quantitative research, will be used to empirically verify the hypotheses related to the research problem presented.
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